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 Underemployment and the  Trickle-Down of Unemployment†
By Regis Barnichon and Yanos Zylberberg*
A substantial fraction of workers are  underemployed, i.e., employed 
in jobs for which they are  overqualified, and that fraction—the 
 underemployment rate—is higher in recessions. To explain these 
facts, we build a search model with an endogenous “ranking” mech-
anism, in which  high-skill applicants are systematically hired over 
 less-skilled competing applicants. Some  high-skill workers become 
 underemployed in order to escape the competition for  high-skill jobs 
and find a job more rapidly at the expense of  less-skilled workers. 
Quantitatively, the model can capture the key characteristics of 
 underemployment, notably the fact that both the  underemployment 
rate and the wage loss associated with becoming  underemployed 
increase in recessions. (JEL E24, E32, J24, J64)
“The recession left millions of  college-educated working in coffee 
shops and retail stores.”1 (Wall Street Journal 2013)
While the unemployment rate is the traditional gauge of the labor market, thispaper argues that it misses an important dimension of the state of the labor 
market— underemployment. In the United States, a substantial fraction of workers are 
 underemployed, i.e., employed in jobs for which they are  overqualified, and that frac-
tion—the  underemployment rate—is strongly  countercyclical, increasing markedly in 
slack labor markets. As shown in Figure 1, the fraction of US college graduates work-
ing in lower  skill-requirement occupations increased from 38.5 percent in 2008 to 41.5 
percent in 2012. In other words, in those four years, the number of  underemployed 
workers increased by 3 million, almost half as much as the increase in unemployed 
workers (about 7 million workers) over the same period.
While  underemployment finds a large echo in the media, there is surprisingly lit-
tle work on the determinants of  underemployment and its implications for business 
1 Casselman, Ben. 2013. “College Grads May Be Stuck in Low-Skill Jobs.” The Wall Street Journal, March 26. 
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cycle fluctuations. In this paper, we study the characteristics and the determinants of 
 underemployment. First, we document new stylized facts about  underemployment, 
notably its  counter-cyclicality. Second, we provide a quantitative model that can 
explain the existence and  counter-cyclicality of  underemployment, and we use the 
model to explore the efficiency and distributional consequences of  underemployment.
We show three stylized facts using CPS micro data: (i)  underemployment is 
 countercyclical, (ii)  underemployment is costly, an  underemployed worker earns sub-
stantially less than his  non-underemployed counterpart, and (iii)  underemployment 
is a persistent state with more than 70 percent of newly  underemployed workers still 
 underemployed one year later.
We develop a search model of  underemployment in which some  high-skill work-
ers become  underemployed in order to escape competition from their  high-skill 
peers and find a job more easily. The key ingredients of our model are heterogene-
ity across workers and jobs, coordination frictions, and wage competition between 
workers. Workers differ in their skill level, islands differ in their productivity level, 
and workers direct their search to one island. In each island, there are coordination 
frictions: some vacancies will receive multiple applications while other vacancies 
will have no applicants, and not every worker will get a job. Importantly, when a 
vacancy receives multiple applications, hiring is not random; applicants compete 
for the job during wage bargaining, and the firm ends up hiring the most profitable 
applicant. The negotiated wage then depends on both the number and the skills of 
other applicants. Through the wage bargaining process, the model generates endog-
enously a “ranking” mechanism favoring  high-skill job seekers, as  high-skill appli-
cants are systematically hired over  less-skilled competing applicants.
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Figure 1. Underemployment (UE) and Unemployment (UR) in the United States
Notes: Unemployment rate (UR, dashed line) and underemployment rate (UE, plain line), defined as the fraction of 
individuals with some college education (or more) working in occupations requiring at most a high school degree 
(as defined in the 2012 Occupational Outlook Handbook). The underemployment rate series is cleared from com-
positional effects, as described in the main text.
Source: Current Population Survey, 1983–2013 
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We first present a simpler static version of our model that allows us to con-
vey the main intuition and characterize analytically a number of properties of 
 underemployment: (i) existence, (ii)  counter-cyclicality, (iii)  re-distributional 
consequences, and (iv) (in)efficiency. First,  underemployment exists, not because 
 low-qualification jobs are more abundant, but because the competition to get a 
 low-qualification job is, from the viewpoint of  high-skill workers, less intense. 
Second, following an adverse aggregate labor demand shock affecting all types 
of jobs,  high-skill workers are less affected by the drop in  low-requirement jobs 
because of their ranking advantage. As a result, they smooth the adverse aggregate 
shock by moving down the job ladder in greater proportion, and  underemployment 
increases in recessions. However, this smoothing takes place at the expense of 
 low-skill workers, and the  counter-cyclicality of  underemployment exacerbates the 
income volatility faced by the  low-skilled. In other words, the  counter-cyclicality 
of  underemployment has distributional consequences, and during recessions unem-
ployment trickles down from the  high-skilled to the  low-skilled. Finally, the level of 
 underemployment is generally inefficient, and there is too much  underemployment 
in the decentralized allocation. Although the constrained optimal allocation in which 
the planner allocates job seekers calls for some level of  underemployment in order 
to maximize the matching probability of  high-skill workers, the  low-requirement 
jobs are too attractive to  high-skill workers.
We then simulate a dynamic and stochastic version of our general equilibrium 
model with aggregate productivity shocks, and we assess its ability to quantitatively 
account for the stylized facts documented in the first part of the paper. The model can 
match key features of the US labor market; notably the level and  counter-cyclicality 
of  underemployment as well as the level and cyclicality of the wages and job-find-
ing rates of the different skill groups. In particular, consistent with the data, the 
model implies that both the wage cost of  underemployment and  underemployment 
increase during recessions.
The phenomenon of  underemployment relates closely to the phenomenon 
of  over-education,2 which goes back to the 1970s when the supply of educated 
workers outpaced its demand in the labor market, apparently resulting in a sub-
stantial reduction in the returns to schooling (Freeman 1976; McGuinness 2006). 
While the literature on  over-education has focused on  low-frequency patterns, our 
interest is instead on business cycle fluctuations. Our finding of a  countercyclical 
 underemployment rate relates to an old literature on “cyclical upgrading”—the pos-
sibility that the quality of matches improves in tighter labor markets (Reder 1955; 
Okun 1973)—and is consistent with recent evidence by (Beaudry, Green, and Sand 
2013) and (Abel and Deitz forthcoming) for the United States.3 More generally, 
the  counter-cyclicality of  underemployment echoes the  counter-cyclicality of mis-
match (S¸ahin et al. 2014), and our paper relates to recent work on worker mobil-
ity across occupations or industries over the business cycle (Alvarez and Shimer 
2011,  Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers 2013, Chang 2011, Pilossoph 2012), although 
2 Since we take the education level as given and study the resulting worker allocation problem, our focus is 
different from the  over-education literature, which mainly studies the returns from schooling. 
3 Note, however, that Gautier et al. (2002) finds no evidence of cyclical upgrading in the Netherlands. 
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we focus on vertical  mobility—between  high-degree requirement and  low-degree 
requirement occupations.
Our modeling of  underemployment revives an older idea from Thurow (1975), in 
which individuals compete against one another for job opportunities, and in which 
higher educated workers can crowd out lower educated workers.4 Relative to more 
recent work, our modeling of  underemployment builds on the random matching 
literature with multiple islands and heterogeneous agents,5 and on the competitive 
search literature with heterogeneous agents,6 in which firms post wage offers and 
workers can direct their search to their most preferred markets. In contrast to the 
random matching literature, we allow firms to bargain with multiple applicants. 
This feature is central to generating  countercyclical  underemployment. In contrast 
to the competitive search literature, we relax the  wage-posting assumption that firms 
commit to a wage and cannot negotiate a lower wage when they receive multiple 
applications.
To capture wage negotiations with multiple and heterogeneous applicants in a 
 nonrandom hiring setting, we propose a tractable bargaining setup that embeds the 
bargaining outcome of two important benchmarks in the literature. When negoti-
ation involves only one applicant, the surplus is shared as in a Nash bargaining 
game. When bargaining takes place with multiple applicants, our setup embeds the 
job auction outcome of Shimer (1999) and Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) as a 
special case.7 The difference with Shimer (1999) and Julien, Kennes, and King 
(2000) is how the surplus generated by the  first-best applicant over the  second-best 
applicant—the marginal surplus of the  first-best applicant—is shared between the 
 first-best applicant and the firm. In Shimer (1999) and Julien, Kennes, and King 
(2000), the  first-best applicant captures all the marginal surplus, but, in our frame-
work, this is not necessarily the case as the marginal surplus is split between the firm 
and the worker.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section I, we study the prop-
erties of  underemployment. Section II presents a static model of  underemployment, 
in partial equilibrium and in general equilibrium, and discusses the optimality of the 
decentralized allocation. Section III presents a dynamic and stochastic version of our 
model and assesses its quantitative performances, and the final section concludes.
I. The Anatomy of  Underemployment
This section presents three stylized facts about  underemployment in the United 
States: (i)  underemployment is  countercyclical, (ii)  underemployment is a persistent 
4 Another line of research aims to explain the existence of  over-education with career mobility and  on-the-job 
search (Sicherman 1991; Sicherman and Galor 1990; Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno 2009), as  high-educated 
workers can choose to become  underemployed in order to get better jobs later. However, the low exit rate out of 
 underemployment that we document suggests that career mobility cannot be the only mechanism at play. 
5 See Albrecht and Vroman (2002); Gautier (2002); Blázquez and Jansen (2008); Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno 
(2009); and Charlot and Decreuse (2010). 
6 See Shi (2001, 2002), Shimer (2005a), and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010). 
7 More generally, our wage bargaining setup relates to the  competing-auction theories of McAfee (1993), Peters 
(1997), and Peters and Severinov (1997). 
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state for workers who decide to move down the job ladder, and (iii) moving down the 
job ladder implies a substantial wage loss and that wage loss is larger in recessions.
A. The Cyclicality of  Underemployment
We define as  underemployed an individual with some college (or more) who is 
employed in an occupation that requires at most a  high school degree.8
Occupations are defined at the  three-digit Standard Occupational Classification 
level. To measure a worker’s education level and occupation we use  micro-data from 
the CPS between 1979 and 2013. To measure the degree requirement of an occupa-
tion we use data from the BLS 2012 Occupational Outlook Handbook on the edu-
cation requirements by occupation. The BLS determines the education requirement 
of each occupation from federal and state regulations and from the typical path of 
entry into a job. We keep the education requirements by occupation fixed over time.9
Figure 1 plots the US  underemployment rate—the fraction of working  college 
educated individuals who are  underemployed—cleared from composition effects 
over 1983–2013.10 We can see that  underemployment is  countercyclical, increasing 
in periods of slack labor market, but also that  underemployment lags unemployment 
(by 5 to 8 quarters, Table 1).
B. The Permanence of  Underemployment
We now show using CPS micro data that becoming  underemployed is not a transi-
tory state for  high-educated workers. Instead, more than 70 percent of  high-educated 
workers who move down the job ladder are still  underemployed (or  out-of-job) one 
year later.
In the CPS, an individual is surveyed for four consecutive months, left out for 
eight months, and then surveyed again for four consecutive months, allowing us 
to observe the same individual across eight surveys. To evaluate the persistence of 
 underemployment, we exploit the panel dimension of the CPS, and we measure the 
fraction of “newly  underemployed” workers who are still  underemployed one year 
later.
8 Changing the education threshold, for instance by defining as  underemployed an individual with a college 
degree working in an occupation requiring “some college but no degree,” gives very similar conclusions and styl-
ized facts. Only the average level of  underemployment is changed. 
9 Alternatively, we can define education requirements from the average education level observed in each occu-
pation. As a robustness exercise, we construct the typical path of entry into an occupation from the average educa-
tion level of that occupation during the 1984–1990 sample period, and we define the  underemployment rate as the 
fraction of workers that are  overqualified relative to the typical path of entry. As apparent in Appendix Figure A1, 
the resulting  underemployment series has very similar cyclical properties. 
10 We control for composition effects, as fluctuations in the  underemployment rate could be due to demograph-
ics or  industry-composition effects. For instance, if certain industries feature more  underemployment than others, 
and if these industries have more cyclical employment, the  underemployment rate would appear to be cyclical. To 
control for composition, we regress a dummy capturing whether an individual is  underemployed on a set of industry 
fixed effects (defined at the  three-digit NAICS level), seasonal dummies, age and sex of the surveyed individual,  and 
state-fixed effects, and we plot the residual of this regression centered at the mean of the  underemployment rate over 
the sample period. Because of changes in industry group definitions in 1983, the  underemployment rate reported in 
Figure 1 only starts in 1983. As a sensitivity analysis, we also report in Appendix Figure A1 an  underemployment 
rate series where we keep  between-industry variations and only control for the observable characteristics of job 
seekers. 
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More specifically, we proceed in two steps. In a first step, we use the first four 
survey months to identify “newly  underemployed” individuals. We define as “newly 
 underemployed” an individual who is unemployed in the first survey month, reports 
a previous occupation in line with his education level,11 and finds an  underemployed 
job during the first four survey months. In a second step, we use the four surveys 
conducted after the  eight-month break to observe the worker’s employment status 
exactly one year after becoming  underemployed.
As shown in Table 2, only 28 percent of newly  underemployed workers move 
back up the job ladder within a year, indicating that  underemployment does not 
appear to be a strong jumping board for better jobs. Instead,  underemployment 
appears to be a persistent state for many workers.12
C. The Wage of  Underemployment
Using CPS micro data, we now evaluate the level and the cyclicality of the 
wage loss associated with becoming  underemployed. We also assess whether 
 high-educated workers earn a premium over  low-educated workers employed in the 
same occupation.
The Wage Cost of  Underemployment.—To measure the wage cost of 
 underemployment, we need to compare the hiring wage of  underemployed individ-
uals with the hiring wage of identical individuals who find occupations in line with 
their education (individuals referred to as “ well-employed” hereafter). Unfortunately, 
this thought experiment is not possible because of unobserved heterogeneity. If indi-
viduals with lower (unobserved) ability select themselves into  underemployment 
11 The CPS asks job seekers about their previous occupation, which, combined with the reported education 
level, allows us to evaluate whether an individual was previously employed in an occupation matching his education 
level. 
12 Assuming that labor market transitions follow a Markov process, this fraction implies that the average time 
to wait before moving up the job ladder for a newly  underemployed worker is  1/0.28 , which amounts to about 3.5 
years. This finding is in line with independent evidence from Verhaest and Schatteman (2010), which follows school 
leavers for seven years after their entry into the labor market and finds that  underemployment is a persistent state. 
Table 1—Cross-Correlations between the Unemployment Rate and the Underemployment Rate, 
1983–2013
Lags(−)/Leads(+) of the unemployment rate (quarters)
  − 4   0   + 4   + 8   + 16 
Correlation −0.01 0.22 0.53 0.64 −0.03
[−0.18, 0.16] [0.05, 0.37] [0.39, 0.64] [0.53, 0.73] [−0.21, 0.15]
Notes: This table reports the cross-correlations between the detrended unemployment rate and the detrended under-
employment rate, defined as the fraction of individuals with some college education (or more) working in occu-
pations requiring at most a high school degree (as defined in the 2012 Occupational Outlook Handbook). The 
underemployment rate series is cleared from compositional effects, as in Figure 1. Both series are detrended with 
an HP-filter  λ = 105. Confidence intervals in brackets are calculated by using Fisher’s  z transform (at the 95 per-
cent confidence level).
Source: Current Population Survey, 1983–2013 
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more often than individuals with higher (unobserved) ability, the hiring wage gap 
between  underemployed and  well-employed individuals will also reflect unobserved 
heterogeneity in ability instead of the true wage cost of  underemployment.
In order to get as close as possible to the ideal thought experiment (within the 
constraints of the CPS) and evaluate the wage cost of  underemployment, we proceed 
as follows.
We use data from the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) over 
1979–2013, and we consider the following baseline equation:
(1)  ω ijt = α + β  D ijt ue + γ  X it +  μ t +  ε ijt , 
in which we model the hiring wage of a highly educated (some college or more) 
unemployed individual of type  i finding a job of type  j in period  t . Our dependent 
variable,  ω ijt , is the logarithm of the real hourly wage of new hires.13 The variable 
D ijt 
ue is a dummy equal to 1 if the  newly hired individual is  underemployed, and  β is 
our coefficient of interest, meant to capture the “wage cost” of  underemployment. 
The vector  X it includes observable individual characteristics, and  μ t is a time fixed 
effect to control for cyclical variations.
To make sure that the wage gap coefficient  β is not driven by the presence of 
(unobserved)  low-ability workers who are always  underemployed, we estimate 
equation (1) using only individuals who are unemployed in a given survey month, 
report a previous occupation in line with their education level, and find a job— 
underemployed or not—during the next survey month.14
We then consider two specifications. In the first specification, we evaluate the 
wage gap after controlling for a range of observables  X it meant to capture selection 
into  underemployment. Specifically, we include the usual observable characteristics 
(age, sex, state of residence) as well as previous occupation fixed effects. The use 
of  previous-occupation fixed effects implies that we are comparing the hiring wage 
of individuals who used to work in the same occupation (defined at the  three-digit 
13 The hiring wage is the hourly wage deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) deflator. 
14 Indeed, the group of  underemployed workers is likely composed of workers with different unobserved 
characteristics. In particular, some low unobserved ability (or low college quality)  college educated workers may 
be “permanently”  underemployed, i.e., always employed in jobs that do not require some college. Since these 
 low-ability workers will always receive a lower wage than  high-ability workers, looking at the unconditional wage 
difference between  well-employed and  underemployed workers would bias our result toward a high wage cost of 
 underemployment. To address this issue, we only include “marginal”  underemployed workers (workers who used 
to be  well employed and just moved down the job ladder) to the sample of  newly hired workers. 
Table 2—Permanence of Underemployment, 1979–2013
Employment status one year after hiring   E L   E H   U 
Fraction 0.645 0.268 0.090
Notes: Distribution of newly underemployed workers one year after having been hired in an underemployed occu-
pation.  E L denotes employment in an occupation requiring at most a high school degree (i.e., underemployment),  
E H denotes employment in an occupation requiring more than a high school degree, and  U denotes unemployment. 
Sample contains 1,210 observations.
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level).15 By focusing on narrowly defined occupations, the goal is to restrict the 
sample to similar individuals. However, this first specification could still be affected 
by selection on unobservables since demographics and previous occupation fixed 
effects may not control for all of the unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. 
In a second specification, we thus add an additional control, the wage in the previ-
ous occupation.16 Assuming that wage differences reflect unobserved heterogeneity 
(given that we already control for the usual observable characteristics), controlling 
for the previous wage will help us control for part of the unobserved selection into 
 underemployment.
The first panel of Table 3 presents the results. As shown in the first col-
umn of Table 3, the unconditional hiring wage gap between  underemployed and 
 well-employed individuals is about  40 percent. Controlling for age, sex, and previ-
ous occupation fixed effects reduces the estimate only slightly to  32 percent (sec-
ond column). After including past wages, the estimate falls some more but remains 
large and significant at  28 percent (third column), implying that the wage cost of 
 underemployment is likely to be substantial. Finally, controlling for unemployment 
duration, as a proxy for search behavior, does not modify the wage cost estimate.
Although we cannot evaluate the cyclicality of the wage cost of  underemployment 
using our preferred specification that controls for the previous wage, we can 
still use our first specification with all the other controls (age, sex, state of resi-
dence, and previous occupation fixed effects).17 As shown in Table 4, the wage 
cost of  underemployment is higher in slack labor markets; being  4–5 percent 
larger whenever labor market slack (measured from the unemployment rate of the 
 vacancy-unemployment ratio) is  one-standard deviation above its mean. Note, how-
ever, that there are relative few wage observations in slack labor markets, and the 
evidence is only suggestive—being only significant at the 6 percent margin.18
Wage Premium.—We now study the “wage premium” of  underemployment, i.e., 
the difference between the wage of an  underemployed  high-educated worker and 
the wage of a  low-educated worker employed in the same occupation, defined at the 
 three-digit level.
15 There are around 500 occupations at the  three-digit level in the CPS, so that the use of previous occupation 
fixed effects allows us to compare individuals who used to work in similar occupations. 
16 Controlling for the wage in the previous occupation is, however, only possible for a subset of the sample. 
Since wages are only observed in the fourth and eighth survey, we need to (i) match individuals across the eight 
surveys (as in the previous section on the permanence of  underemployment), (ii) isolate individuals who are  well 
employed (i.e., in an occupation matching their education level) in the fourth survey, and (iii) restrict ourselves to 
individuals who found a job between the seventh and eighth survey (since we are focusing on the hiring wage). 
17 Because of sample size, we cannot assess the cyclicality of the wage cost of  underemployment with the same 
restricted sample as in Table 3. We use instead the hiring wage of all  underemployed workers. 
18 Despite all our efforts to control for changes in composition, some of the cyclicality in the wage cost of 
 underemployment could be driven by cyclical variations in the relative (unobserved) ability of  high-skilled in the 
two islands. With unobserved heterogeneity among the  high-skilled (for instance, college degrees of different val-
ues), the relative ability of job seekers in the  high-tech island would increase during a recession, if the  low-ability 
 high-skill workers are more likely to become  underemployed than the  high-ability,  high-skilled, and this would 
widen the observed wage gap between the two islands. To allow for this possibility and make an  apples-to-apples 
comparison between data and model, our model in Section III will feature (unobserved) worker heterogeneity 
among the  high-skilled. 
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We use as before data from the CPS MORG over 1979–2013, and we consider 
the following specification:
(2)  ω ikt = a + b D it c + c  X it +  ν k +  d t +  e ikt , 
where  i indexes an unemployed worker finding an occupation  k requiring low educa-
tion in period  t , and  D it 
c is a dummy equal to one if the worker has a college degree. 
In this specification, we control for invariant  occupation-specific characteristics 
(fixed effects  ν k for  three-digit occupational code). The coefficient  b then captures 
the  worker-specific wage premium associated with a college education.
As shown in the second panel of Table 3, we find that  high-educated and 
 low-educated workers hired in the same occupation are treated differently by firms: 
 high-educated workers receive a premium in their hiring wage of about  25 percent 
compared to  low-educated workers.19
19 This number is consistent with previous findings on the effect of  over-education on wages (Duncan and 
Hoffman 1981). Note, however, that unobserved heterogeneity in occupations could lead us to  overestimate the 
Table 3—Wage Differences by Occupation Degree Requirements and Education
Hiring wage (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Underemployed dummy –0.399 –0.319 –0.281 –0.281
(0.042) (0.047) (0.044) (0.045)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Past-occupation fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Past wage No No Yes Yes
Unemployment duration No No No Yes
Observations 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,321
Panel B
Hiring wage
College education dummy 0.282 0.248 0.251 0.236
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
Sample All All All Homog. occ.
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current-occupation fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment duration No No Yes Yes
Observations 26,302 26,302 26,302 11,882
Notes: In panel A, the dependent variable is the hiring wage of an unemployed individual with some college edu-
cation, and previously employed in an occupation requiring more than a high-school degree (as defined in the 
2012 Occupational Outlook Handbook). The underemployment dummy equals one if the individual has just been 
hired in an occupation requiring a high school degree or less. In panel B, the dependent variable is the hiring wage 
of an unemployed individual (either newly underemployed or with low education) in an occupation requiring a 
high school degree or less. The college education dummy equals 1 if the individual has some college experience. 
Controls for individual characteristics include a set of dummies for age, sex, and marital status. All regressions 
include a set of dummies for the state of residence, and a set of dummies for the date (quarter/year) of inter-
view. The sample Homog. occ. excludes all census occupations that are further disaggregated in the 2010 Standard 
Occupational Classification. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Source: Current Population Survey, 1979–2013 
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II. A Static General Equilibrium Model of  Underemployment
In this paper, we develop a search model that can rationalize the existence 
and  counter-cyclicality of  underemployment. A novel aspect of the model is that 
matching is not strictly random. As we argue in the Appendix, explaining the 
 counter-cyclicality of  underemployment in a model with random matching requires 
that either the wage cost of  underemployment is lower in recessions or that finding 
a job in a  low-requirement occupation is easier in recessions. However, neither of 
these two conditions appear to hold in the data.
Instead, we propose a model with an alternative matching process, in which a 
vacancy can simultaneously receive multiple applications and where applicants 
compete for the job during the wage bargaining process. We will see that this setup 
endogenously generates a “ranking” mechanism a la Blanchard and Diamond 
(1994), in which  high-skill applicants are systematically hired over  less-skilled 
competing applicants.20
wage premium enjoyed by  high-educated workers. For instance, even at the  three-digit occupation level that we 
observe,  high-educated workers could be employed in slightly more complex tasks. To provide some assurance that 
this is not the case, we exploit the overlap between the census occupation classification and the SOC. The census 
occupation classification is derived from the SOC but is also less detailed, as the SOC divides many census occupa-
tions into  subgroups. To isolate more homogeneous groups, we estimate the same specification as in column 3 but 
using only the census occupations that are not further disaggregated in the SOC. Column 4 shows that the estimated 
wage premium is almost unchanged (0 .236 instead of  0.251 ). 
20 In addition to being intuitively appealing, we show in the Appendix that the idea of ranking is consistent with 
experimental data compiled by Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013). Using fictitious job applications in which 
Table 4—Wage Differences by Education and Occupation Degree Requirements—Cyclicality
Hiring wage of college educated workers (1) (2)
Underemployed dummy −0.350 −0.347
(0.013) (0.014)
Underemployed  × Slack 1 −0.043(0.031)
Underemployed  × Slack 2 −0.052(0.029)
State fixed effects Yes Yes
Date fixed effects Yes Yes
Individual characteristics Yes Yes
Past occupation fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 10,566 10,566
Notes: The dependent variable is the hiring wage of an unemployed individual with some college. The 
 underemployed dummy equals 1 if the individual is hired in an occupation requiring a high school degree or less. 
Controls for  individual characteristics include a set of dummies for age, sex, and marital status. All regressions 
also include a set of dummies for the state of residence, the date (quarter/year) of interview and past occupation 
(three-digit). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Slack1 is a dummy equal to 1 if the HP-filtered ( λ = 105) unemployment rate is 1 standard deviation above its average level.  Slack2 is a dummy equal to 1 if (log) 
 vacancy-unemployment is 1 standard deviation below its average level. Vacancy posting is measured as the com-
posite Help Wanted index from Barnichon (2010).
Source: Current Population Survey, 1979–2013 
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We first develop a static general equilibrium model of  underemployment and 
describes its three key ingredients: (i) heterogeneity across workers and jobs, (ii) 
coordination frictions, and (iii) wage competition between workers. We leave a 
dynamic and stochastic version of the model for the next section.
A. Environment
We first describe the environment of the static model, in particular the matching 
friction and the wage bargaining setup.
Preferences, Technology, and Market Structure.—There are two types of risk 
neutral agents in the economy, workers and firms, and the economy consists of two 
islands indexed by  j ∈  {L, H} .21
Island  H has a higher technology level than island  L , so that firms operating in 
islands  H are more productive and referred to as “ high tech.” A firm consists of one 
vacancy, and a firm can enter an island  j by posting a vacancy at a cost  c j > 0 . The 
number of vacancies in each island,  v j , will be determined endogenously by firm 
entry.
Workers are similarly divided into two types  i =  {ℓ, h} characterized by differ-
ent productivity levels. Workers of type  h are the most productive and referred to 
as the  high skilled, while workers of type  ℓ are referred to as the  low skilled. There 
is a mass  n h of type  h agents and a mass  n ℓ , normalized to one, of type- ℓ agents. A 
worker with a job provides inelastically one unit of labor to the firm and receives a 
salary  ω . A worker without a job receives zero.22
Denote by  q L =  n ℓ / v L the ratio of type  ℓ individuals to job openings in island 
L and by  q H =  n h / v H the ratio of type  h individuals to job openings in island  H . 
Ratios  q L and  q H can be seen as the “initial” queue lengths in each island for a given 
number of vacancies, i.e., the hypothetical queue lengths corresponding to the case 
where  low-skill workers are in the low productivity island,  high-skill workers in the 
high productivity island, and workers are not allowed to move.
A firm operating in island  j and paired with a worker of type  i produces  φ ij for (i, j )  ∈  {ℓ, h} ×  {L, H} . Unmatched jobs and workers produce nothing.
Finally, in order to ensure assortative matching in equilibrium, we posit some 
complementarity between workers’ skill and firms’ technology and assume (log) 
 supermodularity, i.e.,  φ ℓH / φ ℓL <  φ hH / φ hL .
Coordination Frictions.—Each worker decides to which island to send a job 
application.23 In a large anonymous market, workers cannot coordinate on which 
both the quality of individual applications and the quality of the application pool are randomized, we find that the 
rank of a candidate in a queue of applications influences his  call-back rate beyond the sheer quality of his résumé. 
21 We focus on the case with only two islands, since that case already contains the most interesting lessons from 
our model. Characterizing the equilibrium in a model with more than two islands is relatively straightforward and 
is discussed in the online Appendix. 
22 The assumption of no unemployment benefits or home production is only used here for analytical simplicity 
and will be relaxed in the dynamic version of the model. 
23 An observationally equivalent formulation of our model would be to assume that each worker can simulta-
neously search across different islands but must choose how to allocate his (finite) search time across islands. In 
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firm to apply to, leading to coordination frictions in each island. Some firms will 
get multiple applications, while others receive none. Some firms will receive appli-
cations from workers of different types, while others will receive applications from 
workers of the same type.
We assume that workers apply at random in a market with many workers and 
firms. We represent the matching process in each island by an  urn-ball match-
ing function as in Butters (1977), in which each application (ball) is randomly 
and independently allocated to a vacancy (urn). With a large number  V of vacan-
cies and numbers  N ℓ and  N h of  low-skill and  high-skill applicants, the probability 
 P( a ℓ ,  a h ) that a firm faces  a ℓ  low-skill applicants and  a h  high-skill applicants 
follows a multinomial distribution that can be approximated with a Poisson 
distribution,
  P( a ℓ ,  a h ) =  
 (  N ℓ  _V ) 
 a ℓ 
 e − 
 N ℓ  _
V
  
 
 a ℓ !   
 (  N h  _V ) 
 a h 
 e − 
 N h  _
V
  
 
 a h ! . 
Wage Negotiation and the Hiring Decision.—In this section, we describe the 
wage bargaining process that takes place between a firm and its (possibly multiple) 
job candidate(s). Specifically, we present a tractable bargaining setup that can cap-
ture wage negotiations with multiple and heterogeneous applicants in a  nonrandom 
hiring setting. The outcome of our wage bargaining collapses to the standard Nash 
bargaining outcome when the firm negotiates with only one applicant.
There is perfect information, and all agents observe the pool of applicants and 
their types. With probability  1 − β , the firm makes a  take-it-or-leave-it offer to its 
preferred candidate, and with probability  β each candidate makes a  take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to the firm, as in a  first-price,  sealed-bid auction.
Let  φ 1st denote the output generated by the  first-best applicant (the most pro-
ductive) and  φ 2nd ≤  φ 1st denote the output generated by the  second-best applicant (with the convention that  φ 2nd = 0 if there is no second applicant). The outcome of 
the wage bargaining process is24
(3)  ω = β( φ 1st −  φ 2nd ). 
that formulation, a  high-tech worker would send his application to an island at random, with the probability  x h of 
sending to a given island being the choice variable. 
24 To prove equation (3), consider the two bargaining situations. When the firm makes the  take-it-or-leave-it 
offer (with probability  1 − β ), it captures all the surplus: the  first-best applicant is hired and only gets paid his out-
side option. When job applicants make the  take-it-or-leave-it offer (with probability  β ), the  first-best applicant gets 
the job by offering a wage that gives the firm all the surplus from the  second-best applicant. Thus, even when he 
makes the offer, the  first-best candidate only extracts his marginal surplus over the  second-best candidate. 
52 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MACROECONOMICS APRIL 2019
In expectation, the firm gets all the surplus generated by the  second-best applicant 
and a fraction  (1 − β) of the additional surplus generated by the  first-best applicant 
over the  second-best.25
Note that the outcome of our wage bargaining  setup encompasses some 
 well-known allocation mechanisms. When there is only one applicant 
(i.e.,  φ  2 nd  = 0 ), the wage bargaining outcome is identical to the standard Nash bar-
gaining case: the worker gets a wage  ω = β  φ  1 st  , i.e., a share  β of the surplus. When 
the two best candidates are identical (i.e.,  φ  1 st  =  φ  2 nd  ), as would be the case with 
homogeneous applicants, the wage bargaining outcome coincides with job auctions 
(Shimer 1999; Julien, Kennes, and King 2000); the firm gets all the surplus from 
the match, and the hired candidate (chosen at random among the applicants) gets 
his outside option.
Timing.—The timing of events is as follows. Each worker chooses which island 
to send an application to. In parallel, each potential firm entrant decides whether 
to post a vacancy in any given island. In each island, applications are randomly 
allocated to vacancies. A wage negotiation ensues between the firm and its (pos-
sibly multiple) applicants.  Firm-worker matches are formed and production starts. 
Finally, firms pay workers and realize profits.
B. Equilibrium
Partial Equilibrium with Exogenous Labor Demand.—In order to clarify how 
workers decide on which island to search, we start with the partial equilibrium (PE) 
with exogenous labor demand, i.e., taking the number of vacancies (and thus initial 
queue lengths  ( q H ,  q L ) ) in each island as given.
DEFINITION 1: (Partial Equilibrium Allocation). Workers make optimal deci-
sions. Each worker of each type  i ∈  {ℓ, h} decides on which island  j ∈  {L, H} 
to search for a job. The equilibrium is given by a mapping of such worker choices 
 C i :  [ 0,  n i ] ↦  {L, H} for each type  i .
Let  x h denote the  underemployment rate, i.e., the share of type- h workers search-
ing in island  L , and let  E  ω i, j denote the expected income of an individual of type  i 
searching in island  j .
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium allocation in partial 
equilibrium.26
25 Our simple wage bargaining game provides a tractable wage bargaining rule. Allowing for a more general 
bargaining game would complicate the analysis but would not affect the property that the outside option of the 
firm depends on the quality and number of the other applicants. For instance, one could think of a more general 
framework in which the firm starts a game of alternating offers with the best applicant, and that, if these negotia-
tions  break down, the firm starts a game of alternating offers with the  second-best applicant, etc., as in models of 
 intra-firm bargaining (Stole and Zwiebel 1996; Brügemann, Gautier, and Menzio 2015). While more involved, the 
outcome of the negotiation would be qualitatively comparable: the  best applicant would get the job and his wage 
would depend negatively on the productivity and number of other applicants. 
26 We only focus on economies with a positive rate of  underemployment in equilibrium. The online Appendix 
describes the condition that ensures the existence of a strictly positive rate of  underemployment and shows that 
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PROPOSITION 1: There is a unique equilibrium allocation of workers satisfying:
 (i )  type- h workers are indifferent between islands  L and  H , and  x h is given by the 
arbitrage condition
  A( x h ) = − E  ω hH + E  ω hL = 0 
  with
  E  ω hH = β e − q H (1− x h )  φ hH , E  ω hL = β e − q L x h n h  [ e − q L   φ hL + ( φ hL −  φ ℓL ) (1 −  e − q L  ) ] . 
 (ii )  type- ℓ workers only look for jobs in island  L and their expected income is
  E  ω ℓL = β  e − q L (1+ x h n h )  φ ℓL .
PROOF:
See the online Appendix.
Each worker searches for a job in the island that provides the highest expected 
wage, and in equilibrium, a  high-skill (type- h ) worker is indifferent between look-
ing for a job in island  H —the “ high-tech island”—and looking for a job in island 
L —the “ low-tech island”—while a  low-skill (type- ℓ ) worker strictly prefers look-
ing for a job in the  low-tech island (island  L ). The arbitrage condition,  A( x h ) = 0 , 
determines the equilibrium allocation of type- h workers across the two islands.
Panel A of Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium allocation of  high-skill workers as the 
intersection of the  E  ω hL curve, the expected wage earned in island  L , and the  E  ω hH 
curve, the expected wage earned in island  H . The  E  ω hH curve is increasing in  x h : an 
increase in the fraction of  high-skill workers searching in island  L lowers congestion 
in island  H , which lessens the competition  high-skill workers face in island  H and 
increases the expected wage. By contrast, an increase in the fraction of  high-skill 
workers searching in island  L makes island  L more congested, which increases the 
competition workers face in island  L and lowers the expected wage. Intuitively, the 
expected income of  high-skill workers is driven by their uniqueness, as it deter-
mines both their ability to find a job easily (by being preferably hired over  low-skill 
workers) and their ability to obtain a wage premium over low skill workers. As the 
number of  high-skill workers increases, each  high-skill worker becomes less unique 
and thus has a lower job-finding rate (facing more competition from their peers) and 
receives a lower wage premium.
Implications of Underemployment.—In this section, we discuss two novel impli-
cations of our model.
the equilibrium is unique. The condition is that the number of vacancies in island H is not too large, so that 
 E  ω hH < E  ω hL when  x h = 0 . 
54 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MACROECONOMICS APRIL 2019
The  Trickle-Down of Unemployment.—First,  underemployment can have regres-
sive distributional implications. When  high-skill workers move down the job ladder, 
they take the jobs of  low-skill individuals. Through this process, unemployment 
trickles down from the  upper occupation groups to the  lower occupation groups.
To see this, consider an adverse labor demand shock affecting only the  high-tech 
island, i.e., an increase in the queue length  q H . As shown in panel A of Figure 3, 
it shifts down the  E  ω hH curve—the expected wage earned in island  H —and gen-
erates a higher equilibrium  underemployment rate  x h as  high-skill workers use 
 underemployment to smooth the shock and the associated decline in expected 
income. As a result,  low-skill workers see a decrease in their expected earnings 
(as shown by the  E  ω ℓL curve) because they face more competition from  high-skill 
workers searching in island  L . In other words, a shock affecting the  high-type group 
trickles down to the  lower type group.
The  Counter-Cyclicality of Unemployment.—Second, aggregate shocks generate 
 countercyclical movements in  underemployment. To see this, consider an adverse 
E [ω]
E [ω]
E [ωhH]
E [ωhL]
E [ωhH]
E [ωhL]
Panel A. Partial equilibrium
xh
xh
Panel B. General equilibrium
Figure 2. Expected Wage of Type- h Workers in the High-Tech Island (Island  H ) and in the Low-Tech 
Island (Island  L )
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aggregate shock that affects both islands equally. Specifically, the shock is such 
that, absent any change in the  underemployment rate of  high-skill workers, both 
worker types would be equally affected by the shock. Then, one can show that 
 underemployment unambiguously increases. The following corollary formalizes 
this result.
COROLLARY 1: Consider an adverse aggregate shock that affects the queue 
lengths in each island such that
  Δ  q H (1 −  x h )  = Δ  q L ( n h  x h + 1) > 0 .
Then, the level of  underemployment  x h increases with
  Δ  x h =   φ hL −  φ ℓL   _____________   φ hH ( q L  n h +  q H )  e 
− q L x h n h + q H (1− x h ) Δ  q L > 0. 
AH
BH
AH
AL
BH
BL
AL BL
Panel A. Shock  qH > 0
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Figure 3. Partial Equilibrium: Effects of (Panel A) Shock in the  High-Tech Island (Island  H ),  
and (Panel B) an Aggregate Shock
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PROOF:
See the online Appendix.
To help understand this result, Panel B of Figure 3 plots the corresponding exper-
iment. As can be seen in Figure 3, while the aggregate shock shifts the wage curves 
E [  ω hH ] and  E [  ω ℓL ] by the same amount, Corollary 1 states that the shift in the  E [ ω hL ] curve is less pronounced than the shift in the  E [  ω hH ] curve. This reflects the 
fact that, because of the ranking advantage enjoyed by the  high skilled, they are 
less affected by the decrease in job openings in the  low-tech island than by the 
decrease in job openings in the  high-tech island. As a result,  high-skill workers 
respond to the adverse aggregate shock by moving to the  low-tech island in greater 
proportion, and  underemployment unambiguously increases, i.e.,  underemployment 
is  countercyclical.
Intuitively, our result comes from the fact that  high-skill workers can partially 
jump the queue of unemployed in the  low-tech island but not in the  high-tech island.27 
As a result, the number of job seekers relative to job openings, i.e., the length of the 
unemployment queue, matters less in the  low-tech island, and  high-skill workers are 
less affected by an increase in the queue of unemployed in the  low-tech island than 
by the same increase in the  high-tech island. The  high-skilled can thus smooth an 
adverse aggregate shock at the expense of the  low-skilled by moving down the job 
ladder in greater proportion, and  underemployment is  countercyclical.
General Equilibrium with Endogenous Labor Demand.—We now characterize 
the general equilibrium (GE) with endogenous labor demand. There is an arbitrarily 
large mass of potential entrants who can settle in island  j . A firm still consists of one 
vacancy, and a firm can enter an island  j by posting a vacancy at a cost  c j > 0 . With 
free entry, firms will enter in each island  j until the point where expected profits, 
denoted by  π j , equal the fixed cost  c j . The number of firms and vacancies in each 
island will thus be determined endogenously by firm entry.
DEFINITION 2: (General equilibrium allocation with endogenous firm entry). 
Workers and firms make optimal decisions. Each worker of type  i ∈  {ℓ, h} decides 
on which island  j ∈  {L, H} to search for a job, and each potential firm entrant 
in island  j ∈  {L, H} decides whether or not to post a vacancy. The equilibrium 
is given by worker choices  C i :  [ 0,  n i ] ↦  {L, H} for each worker type  i and firm 
choices  F j :  [ 0, ∞) ↦  {0, 1} for each island  j .
27 Indeed,  high-skill workers do not benefit from any ranking advantage in the  high-tech island, since no 
 low-skill worker searches in that island in equilibrium. 
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The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium allocation.
PROPOSITION 2: There is a unique equilibrium allocation satisfying:
 (i )  The arbitrage conditions characterizing the allocation of workers:
  — type- h workers are indifferent between islands  L and  H , and  x h , the share 
of type- h workers searching in island  L , is given by the arbitrage condition
  A(  x h ,  q L )  = −E  ω hH (  x h ,  q H ) + E  ω hL (  x h ,  q L )  = 0. 
  — type- ℓ workers only look for jobs in island  L .
 (ii ) Firms’ free entry conditions (market clearing) in islands  L and  H :
  {  π L ( x h ,  q L ) =  c L    π H ( x h ,  q H ) =  c H  .
PROOF:
See the online Appendix.
To depict the GE allocation graphically, panel B of Figure 2 proceeds similarly to 
the left panel in the PE case and identifies the equilibrium  underemployment rate as 
the intersection of the  E  ω hL curve, the expected wage for the  high-skilled in island 
L , and the  E  ω hH curve, the expected wage for the  high-skilled in island  H .28
Contrasting the left and right panels of Figure 2 reveals two differences between 
the PE and the GE allocation. First, the  E  ω hH curve, the expected wage earned in 
island  H , is now flat and no longer upward slopping as in PE. This result illustrates 
how “matching with ranking” reduces to random matching (as in Pissarides 1985) 
when workers are homogeneous. Indeed, in our model the  high-tech island is homo-
geneous in equilibrium and only populated by  high-skill job seekers. In Pissarides 
(1985), as in our model, the supply of homogeneous labor has no effect on the 
equilibrium queue length.29 Second, the  E  ω hL curve is decreasing in  x h , as in the PE 
case, but the curve is now less steep. This occurs because of a general equilibrium 
job creation effect, in which firms respond to changes in the average productivity of 
the unemployment pool. Specifically, an increase in the share of  high-skill workers 
searching in island  L raises firms’ probability to meet  high-skill applicants (who 
generate a higher surplus than low skill applicants), raises firms’ profits, and thus 
leads to more job creation.30
28 The proofs underlying Figure 2 are in the online Appendix. 
29 An increase in the number of job seekers raises firms’ matching probability, i.e., reduces hiring costs, which 
leads more firms to enter the market, so that profit and thus the queue length are ultimately unchanged. In other 
words, job creation always compensates any change in the number of job seekers in a homogeneous island. 
30 Such a “job creation” GE effect is well known in random search models with heterogeneous workers. See e.g., 
Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Charlot and Decreuse (2010). However, in a model with random matching, the job 
creation effect leads to an upward sloping wage schedule, so that low-skill workers benefit from  underemployment. 
In our case, the job creation effect does not lead to an upward sloping wage schedule, but makes the wage schedule 
less downward sloping. 
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With the slight differences between PE and GE in mind, it is easy to see that 
the redistributive implications of  underemployment carry on from the PE case to 
the GE case. As in the PE case, an adverse labor demand shock affecting island  H 
(a downward shift in the  E  ω hH curve) will trickle down to island  L , as  high-skill 
workers respond to higher congestion in the  high-tech island by increasing their 
 underemployment rate, which leads to higher congestion for  low-skill workers. The 
only difference with respect to the PE case, is that, thanks to the increased number 
of  high-skill workers in the  low-tech island, job creation is higher in the  low-tech 
island, and this GE effect dampens the  crowding-out coming from the larger number 
of  high-skill workers searching in the  low-tech island.
C. Constrained Optimal Allocation
We now consider the efficiency of the decentralized allocation. We study the 
problem of a planner who can only allocate workers across islands in order to max-
imize total output (net of the cost of posting vacancies) subject to firms’ free entry 
condition and subject to hiring frictions in each island.31
PROPOSITION 3: The constrained optimal allocation  ( x h ∗,  q L ∗ ) is characterized by 
the firms’ free entry conditions in islands  L and  H , and
(4)   A( x h ∗,  q L ∗ ) = −E  ω hH + E  ω hL 
 =  (1 − β)  n h  q L ∗  φ ℓL  e − q L ∗(2 x h ∗n h +1) ( φ hL −  φ ℓL )  1 ___________ 
 
∂ π L ( x h ∗,  q L ∗ ) ∂ q L  
 ≥ 0 ,
with the expression for  ∂ π L ( x h ,  q L )/∂ q L > 0 given in the online Appendix.
If  β < 1 and  φ hL −  φ ℓL > 0 , the decentralized allocation  ( x h ,  q L ) is inefficient 
and has too much  underemployment:  x h >  x h ∗.
PROOF:
See the online Appendix.
The proposition states that the decentralized allocation is, in general, not efficient, 
and that there is too much  underemployment. While we leave a more detailed dis-
cussion of efficiency for the online Appendix, we now discuss the intuition behind 
this result.
31 Note that our exercise differs from the usual approach in the search literature (Hosios 1990), since the planner 
cannot allocate vacancies across islands. The usual trading externalities are also present in our framework, but we 
abstract from them to focus on the worker allocation problem. An extension of our efficiency discussion would be 
to consider the problem of a planner allocating both workers and vacancies across islands. 
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As a preliminary step, it is helpful to note that, in this worker allocation problem, 
maximizing total output while satisfying firms’ zero profit condition is the same as 
maximizing total labor income. Thus, when discussing externalities, we can focus 
on the effect of a worker’s decisions on the expected wage of other job seekers.
Consider first island  H , the  high-tech island. An increase in the share of  high-skill 
workers in the  low-tech island lowers competition between workers in the  high-tech 
island, which ceteris paribus raises the expected wage of job seekers. At the same 
time, the lower number of job seekers in the  high-tech island increases hiring costs 
for firms, which leads to less job creation and ceteris paribus lowers the expected 
wage of job seekers. As we saw in Section IIB, when workers are homogeneous, the 
two effects exactly compensate each other: job creation adjusts to movements in the 
number of job seekers, and the expected income of  high-skill workers is indepen-
dent of the  underemployment rate. In other words,  high-skill workers exert on net 
no externalities on the  high-tech island.
Consider now island  L ; the  low-tech island. Proposition 3 states that there are too 
many  high-skill job seekers in the  low-tech island. Intuitively, the inefficiency stems 
from the fact that the marginal  high-skill job seeker in island  L can change how the 
surplus of a match gets shared (on average) between firms and workers. To see this, 
note that in our wage bargaining setup, a  high-skill worker receives on average a 
share  β of his marginal surplus over the  second-best applicant—equation (3)—so 
that a share  1 − β of this marginal surplus is given to the firm. When  β = 1 , the 
 high-skill worker fully captures his expected marginal surplus, so that his actions 
do not distort the allocation, and the decentralized allocation is efficient. However, 
when  β < 1 , the firm receives some of that marginal surplus, so that a marginal 
 high-skill job seeker in island  L will increase the (average) share of the surplus 
going to the firm. Firms respond by posting more vacancies than they would have 
if an average job seeker had entered island  L , this makes island  L too attractive to 
 high-skill workers, and there is too much  underemployment.32
The central difference between the  low-tech and the  high-tech island is that 
workers are not homogeneous in the  low-tech island, and that a marginal  high-skill 
worker in island  L changes the composition of the pool of job seekers, which can 
alter the surplus sharing rule between firms and workers and distort the allocation. 
When the marginal  high-skill worker gets paid his marginal surplus and thus does 
not affect the firm surplus as in job auctions (Shimer 1999; Julien, Kennes, and King 
2000)—which would correspond in our setup to  β = 1 —the decentralized alloca-
tion is constrained efficient. The inefficiency also disappears when the heterogeneity 
among applicants goes away: when  φ hL −  φ ℓL → 0 the  low-tech island is populated 
by a  quasi-homogeneous population of workers, and the decentralized allocation is 
efficient as shown by equation (4). In a similar vein, when  high-skill workers are 
32 The inefficiency result of Proposition 3 is thus tied to the wage bargaining game and to the sharing rule 
between the firm and the  first-best applicant in the presence of a  second-best applicant. In that wage bargaining 
configuration, one can see the surplus of the (hired)  first-best applicant as being made of two parts: a first part being 
the surplus generated by the  second-best applicant and a second part being the marginal surplus generated by the 
 first-best applicant over the  second-best. Importantly, these two parts are shared differently between the firm and 
the  first-best applicant: while the surplus of the  second-best applicant is fully captured by the firm, the marginal 
surplus of the  first-best applicant is split between the firm and the worker. The inefficiency stems from this property 
because it implies that the share of  high-skill job seekers affects the average share of the surplus going to the firm. 
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very few ( n h ≈ 0 ) and can easily “dilute” themselves in the  low-tech island, most 
bargaining configurations will be between  low-skill applicants,  high-skill job seek-
ers have little effect on surplus sharing, and equation (4) shows that the inefficiency 
disappears. In the other polar case where there are infinitely more  high-skill workers 
than  low-skill workers ( n h  x h ≫ 1 ), most bargaining configurations will be between 
 high-skill applicants and the inefficiency disappears again.
III. A Quantitative Dynamic Stochastic Model with  Underemployment
We now present a dynamic and stochastic version of our general equilibrium 
model. We calibrate the model, evaluate its ability to match the key facts docu-
mented in the empirical section, and then use it to assess the magnitude of the distri-
butional consequences of  underemployment, and the cyclicality of the inefficiency 
associated with  underemployment.
A. A Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model
To bring our theoretical framework to the data, we extend our static general equi-
librium model in a number of dimensions.
First, we extend the model to (i) a dynamic and (ii) a stochastic setting, where the 
economy is hit by aggregate technology shocks. Second, we introduce unobserved 
worker heterogeneity within worker groups.
The economy is composed of a continuum of infinitely lived workers and a con-
tinuum of infinitely lived firms. Time is discrete. All agents are  risk-neutral and 
let  δ denote the discount factor. As in the static model, there are two types of firms 
located in two distinct islands indexed by  j . Each firm can have at most one job, and 
a vacancy can freely be created in each period subject to an  island-specific vacancy 
posting cost  c j . Similarly, workers are heterogeneous and can be of different types  i .
However, and different from the static model, we introduce unobserved hetero-
geneity among  high-skill workers.33 Specifically, we allow for two (unobservable) 
type  h workers; a  low-quality type  h _ and a  high-quality type  
_
 h with productivity in 
island  j satisfying  φ  h _ j <  φ  _ h j . Intuitively, not all  high-educated workers are equally 
skilled; some are intrinsically smarter than others. If the smarter college gradu-
ates never become  underemployed, the econometrician (as in Section I, Table 3) 
will  overestimate the true wage cost of  underemployment. Introducing unobserved 
worker heterogeneity allows us to capture this phenomenon in the model and thus 
allows for a cleaner comparison with our empirical findings from Section I.34 While 
33 Given that our economy only features two islands, the  low-skill group cannot react to aggregate shocks by 
moving further down the job ladder, and introducing unobserved heterogeneity among the  low-skill group is of 
limited interest. See the online Appendix for a discussion of an economy with three islands, in which  mid-skilled 
workers can smooth shocks (and react to a higher number of  high-skill job seekers) by themselves moving to a 
 lower-requirement island. 
34 More specifically, introducing unobserved heterogeneity is necessary to rationalize the existence of 
 underemployment given the large observed wage loss associated with  underemployment (about 28 percent, see 
Table 3). Echoing a point previously made by Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2011), the wage loss associated 
with  underemployment must be compensated by an increase in job finding probability, which is difficult to ratio-
nalize given the already high job-finding rates observed in US data. In our model, only the  low-quality,  high-skill 
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these two  subtypes are unobservable to the econometrician, they are perfectly known 
to workers and firms. We denote by  η h the ratio of type- 
_
 h to type- h _ workers.
Also different from the static model, the productivity of a match is now stochastic 
with the  log-productivity  ln  φ ij, t in island  j ∈  {L, H} for individual  i ∈  {ℓ,  h _,  
_
 h } 
following an AR(1) process
  ln  φ ij, t = ρ ln  φ ij, t−1 + (1 − ρ) ln  φ ij +  τ j  ε t , 
with  ρ < 1 ,  φ ij the average productivity level,  ε t an aggregate productivity shock 
affecting all islands, and  τ j the elasticity of island  j ’s productivity with respect to 
aggregate shocks. The parameter  τ j allows us to capture the fact that some occupa-
tions may be more cyclical than others.
Within each period, the timing of actions is the following. The state of nature 
is revealed, and production takes place. After production, a share  s of  firm-worker 
matches is destroyed exogenously. Vacancies are posted, and job seekers decide 
in which island to search. Upon matching, firms and applicants negotiate over the 
wage and production starts the next period.
Denote by  m a wage bargaining configuration (e.g., a firm bargaining with one 
 high-skill applicant and one  low-skill applicant), by  p ij, t w (m) the probability for a 
worker type- i in island  j to be in wage bargaining configuration  m , and by  p  j, t f (m) 
the probability for a firm in island  j to be in wage bargaining configuration  m . The 
value of unemployment for a type- i worker in island  j ,  U ij, t , is then
 U ij, t = b + δ [ ∑ m  p ij, t w (m)  E t  W ij, t+1 (m )  +  (1 −  ∑ m  p ij, t w (m))  E t  U ij, t+1 ] , 
and  Π j, t o the value for a firm to open a vacancy in island  j is
  Π j, t o = δ  ∑ 
m
  p  j, t f (m)  E t  Π j, t+1 (m ) , 
with  b the flow value of leisure,  E t  W ij, t+1 (m) the expected value of employment 
for a type- i worker in island  j after facing the bargaining configuration  m , and 
 E t  Π j, t+1 (m) the corresponding expected value for the firm.
Upon matching, surplus sharing is determined using the same bargaining game 
as in the static model. The present discounted surplus of the  first-best applicant over 
the  second-best is thus split in shares  β and  1 − β between the firm and the (hired) 
 first-best applicant, while the firm additionally gets all the present discounted sur-
plus from the  second-best applicant. To express this surplus sharing rule, we can use 
a representation in terms of flow payments. Letting  b i, t = (1 − δ)  U i, t denote the 
reservation wage of a type- i worker, the outcome of the wage bargaining process for 
a match in island  j with initial bargaining configuration  m can be written as
   { 
 w ij, t (m) =  b  1 st (m), t + β [ ( φ  1 st (m)j, t −  b  1 st (m), t ) −  ( φ  2 nd (m)j, t −  b  2 nd (m), t ) ] 
      
 π j, t (m) = (1 − β) [ ( φ  1 st (m)j, t −  b  1 st (m), t ) −  ( φ  2 nd (m)j, t −  b  2 nd (m)j, t ) ]  ,
workers become  underemployed in equilibrium, so that the actual wage cost of  underemployment is smaller than 
the wage cost observed by the econometrician. 
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where  w ij, t (m) and  π j, t (m) are the flow payments going to the worker and the firm, 
with  i denoting the hired applicant and  1 st (m) (resp.  2 nd (m) ) denoting the type of 
the  first-best applicant (resp.  second-best applicant) in bargaining configuration 
 m .35
Finally, the value functions  W ij, t (m) and  Π j, t (m) satisfy
    {  W ij, t (m) =  w ij, t (m) + δ(1 − s)  E t  W ij, t+1 (m)  + sδ  E t  U ij, t+1       Π j, t (m) =  π j, t (m)  + δ(1 − s)  E t  Π j, t+1 (m) .
We can now characterize the equilibrium allocation of job seekers and vacancies 
in the following proposition, which generalizes Proposition 2 to a dynamic setting.
PROPOSITION 4: There is a unique equilibrium allocation of job seekers and 
vacancies satisfying the following conditions in each period  t :
 (i ) type- _ h workers only look for jobs in island  H ,
 (ii ) type- h _ workers are indifferent between islands  L and  H , and  x h, t , the share of 
type- h _ workers searching in island  L , is given by the arbitrage condition
  A( x h, t ,  q L, t ,  q H, t ) = − U  h _H, t ( x h, t ,  q H, t )  +  U  h _L, t ( x h, t ,  q L, t )  = 0 ,
 (iii ) type  ℓ workers only look for jobs in island  L .
The firms’ free entry conditions are verified in islands  L and  H :
  {  Π L 
o ( x h, t ,  q L, t ) =  c L 
  
 Π H o ( x h, t ,  q H, t )  =  c H  .
PROOF:
See the online Appendix.
B. Calibration
To calibrate the model, we proceed as follows. We set values for the parameters 
that are directly observable, and we estimate the leftover parameters by matching 
key first moments of the  steady-state economy. Table 5 lists all the parameter values 
used in the quantitative exercise.
35 An implicit assumption in this dynamic model is that the surplus sharing rule agreed upon in the initial 
bargaining state will not be renegotiated at future dates. This is a mild assumption, because the firm can credibly 
commit to never renegotiate with its worker at future dates. Indeed, it is never in the firm’s interest to renegotiate 
because bargaining with only one applicant (as would be the case in a renegotiation with the one hired worker) 
gives the firm its smallest share of the surplus (among all the possible initial bargaining configurations). Since both 
the firm and the worker receive a  nonnegative value from the match, it is never in either party’s interest to break 
the match. 
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We set a monthly discount factor corresponding to a  risk-free interest rate of 5 
percent per annum. We set workers’ separation rate  s and the ratio  n h of  college 
educated workers to  non-college educated workers from CPS micro data over 1983–
2013. We set the income replacement rate to 20 percent, and the workers’ bargaining 
weight to  0.5 , implying that workers and firms are equally likely to make an offer.
To use the  urn-ball matching function in a quantitative context, we proceed 
as Blanchard and Diamond (1994) and introduce a matching efficiency term. 
Specifically, we assume that workers send out an application with an  island-specific 
probability  ν j and we set the  ν j parameters by matching  f h and  f ℓ , the observed aver-
age job-finding rates of  high-skill and  low-skill workers, which satisfy
(5)     {  f h =  [ (1 −  x h )  f  
_
 h H +  x h  f  h _L +  η h  f  _ h H ] / (1 +  η h )    
 f ℓ =  f ℓL  ,
where  f  
_
 h H ,  f  h _H ,  f  h _L , and  f ℓL are the unobserved job-finding rates of the different 
worker types in the different islands.36
36 From the  urn-ball matching function, we get that  f   
_
 h H ,  f  h _H ,  f  h _L , and  f ℓL are given by
(6)   
⎧
 
⎪
⎨⎪
⎩
 f   
_
 h H =  ν H f ( ν H  q H  η h )
  
 f  h _H =  ν H  e − ν H q H η h  f ( ν H  q H (1 −  x h ))
  
 f  h _L =  ν L  f ( ν L  q L  n h  x h ) 
 f ℓL =  ν L  e − ν L q L n h x h  f ( ν L  q L )
 ,
with  f (q) =  (1 −  e −q ) /q and  ν j the matching efficiency of the labor market in island  j . Note that  f   _ h H ,  f  h _H ,  f  h _L are 
unobservable for two reasons. First, we do not observe where  high-educated workers are searching (i.e., in island 
L or in island  H ) so that we cannot compute their job-finding rates, and second, we do not observe whether a 
 high-educated worker is a  high-type  
_
 h or a  low-type  h _. 
Table 5—Parameter Values for the Benchmark Economy
Value Source
Panel A. Calibrated parameters
 δ Discount factor 0.996 Interest rate 5% p.a.
 s Separation rate 0.02 CPS, 1979–2013
 n h Ratio of college educated workers 0.40 CPS, 1983–2013 β Bargaining power 0.50
 b Replacement ratio 0.20
 φ  h _H Productivity (type  h _, island  H ) 1.00 Normalization
 τ L Cyclical elasticity, island  L 1.00 Normalization
 τ H Cyclical elasticity, island  H 0.80 HWOL, 2005–2013
Panel B. Estimated parameters
 φ ℓL Productivity (type  ℓ , island  L ) 0.64
 φ hL Productivity (type  h _, island  L ) 0.80
 φ  _ h H Productivity (type  _ h , island  H ) 1.37
 η h Ratio of type  _ h to type  h _ 0.48
 c L Vacancy-posting cost, island  L 1.48
 c H Vacancy-posting cost, island  H 10.3
 ν L Matching efficiency, island  L 0.35 ν H Matching efficiency, island  H 0.46
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To set  τ j , the cyclical elasticity of island  j , we use job openings data by occupa-
tion from the Conference Board Help Wanted OnLine (HWOL) dataset. While job 
openings by  degree-requirements are not observed, there is a close  correspondence 
between degree requirements and  high-level occupation groups. Services and 
 professional occupations require a bachelor’s degree in most cases (it is true for 
more than 90 percent of the  3-digit occupations in those two categories), while con-
struction and sales typically require less than a high school degree (it is true for 
more than 75 percent of the  3-digit occupations in those two categories). We thus 
proxy job openings with high  degree-requirements with job openings in services and 
professional occupations, and we proxy job openings with low  degree equirements 
with job openings in construction and sales. Since job openings are 20 percent less 
volatile in services and professional occupations than in construction and sales, we 
normalize  τ L = 1 and set  τ H = 0.8 .
The model still requires parameter values for the output of each type of match 
( φ ℓL ,  φ  h _L ,  φ  _ h H ,  φ  h _H ), the ratio  η h of  high-quality to  low-quality type- h workers, and 
the vacancy posting costs in island  L and  H ( c L and  c H ). After normalizing the aver-
age level of  φ  h _H to one, we are left with six free parameters. Since there is no direct 
observable counterpart to these parameters, we estimate their values by matching 
the first moment of the following series—the  underemployment rate ( UE )37—the 
observed wage cost of  underemployment ( w hH / w hL ), the wage premium earned by 
 over-educated workers ( w hL / w ℓL )—all documented in Section I—the wage ratio 
between type- h and type- ℓ workers ( w h / w ℓ ), and the HWOL job openings to job 
seekers ratio in typical  college-level occupations ( q H ) and in typical  high-school 
level occupations ( q L ).
Table 6 reports the model values for the main  steady-state moments: the 
 underemployment rate, the average job-finding rates the different types, and the 
wage premiums across occupations and type. Panel A reports the target moments, 
and panel B reports unobserved moments. When studying Table 6, keep in mind 
our notation for the wages:  w hH ,  w hL , and  w ℓL denote the observed wages of, respec-
tively, type- h workers in island H, type- h workers in island  L , and type- ℓ workers 
in island  L , while  w  h _H ,  w  h _L , and  w  
_
 h H denote the unobserved wages of, respectively, 
type- h _ in island  H , type- h _ in island  L , and type- 
_
 h in island  H . Similar notations 
apply to the job-finding rates.
Of particular interest are the unobserved wages and job-finding rates that the 
parametrized model allows us to infer. First, under the parameter values of Table 5, the 
actual (unobserved) wage cost of  underemployment ( w  h _H / w  h _L ) is 10 percent, instead 
of the observed 28 percent ( w hH / w hL ). With that wage cost of  underemployment, the 
model can rationalize the high level of  underemployment because the cumulative 
wage loss over the expected duration of an  underemployment spell is comparable to 
the cumulative income loss over the expected duration of an unemployment spell in 
the  high-tech island.
37 There is a difference between  x h , the (unobserved) fraction of  high-skill workers searching in the  low-tech 
island, and the observed  underemployment rate,  UE , which is the fraction of  high-skill workers employed in the 
 low-tech island and depends upon past flows and relative job-finding rates. We specify the link between the two 
concepts in the online Appendix. 
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As in the data, type- h workers in island  L earn a wage premium over low-skill 
workers of about 25 percent ( w hL / w ℓL = 1.6/1.28 = 1.25 , panel A).
Turning to job-finding rates, the observed job-finding rates of high- and  low-skill 
workers are of the same order of magnitude (panel A), but they mask large 
 differences across islands and unobserved types. Thanks to their ranking advantage 
over type- ℓ workers, type- h _ workers are about twice as likely to find a job when 
they search in the  low-tech island  L than in the  high-tech island  H (  f  h _L ≈ 2  f  h _H , 
panel B). Type- _ h workers benefit from a similar ranking advantage over type- h _ work-
ers in island  H and are about twice as likely to receive an offer as their  low-quality, 
 high-skill peers (  f  _ h H ≈ 2  f  h _H , panel B).
C. Model Performance
We now assess the performance of our model in matching the key facts high-
lighted in Section I. To solve the model and simulate the effect of aggregate shocks, 
the stochastic process for productivity is discretized using the Tauchen (1986) 
method. We solve the dynamic problem through value function iteration.
Impulse Response Functions.—To illustrate the dynamics of the model, we first 
plot the impulse responses of the variables of interest to a negative aggregate pro-
ductivity shock that lowers productivity in both islands (Figure 4). With lower pro-
ductivity, job openings (i.e., the “initial” queue lengths  q L and  q H ) decline in both 
islands (panel B) and  x h increases as  high-skill workers search in the  low-tech island 
in greater proportion (panel E).38
38 Productivity declines more in the  low-tech island than in the high-tech island ( top-left panel) because the 
 low-tech island is more cyclical than the  high-tech one ( τ L >  τ H ). Regarding the relative responses of  q L and  q H , 
recall that the responses of job openings depend on two factors: (i) the elasticity of job openings to productivity 
Table 6—Steady-State Moments
Underemployed Job-finding rates Wages
Variable   UE   f h   f ℓ   w hH / w hL   w hH / w ℓL 
Panel A. Targets
Data (1983–2013) 0.38 0.27 0.25 1.28 1.60
Model 0.39 0.27 0.25 1.28 1.59
Job-finding rates Wages
Variable   f  
_
 h H   f  h _H   f  h _L   w  h _H /  w  h _L   w  _ h H /  w  h _H 
Panel B. Unobserved moments
Model 0.31 0.14 0.33 1.10 1.32
Notes: The first row reports the average unemployment and job-finding rates over the period 1983–2013, and the 
wage ratios correspond to the results reported in columns 4, panel A, and 3, panel B of Table 3.  f h and  f ℓ denote the 
observed job-finding rates of type- h and type- ℓ workers, and  f  _ h H ,  f  h _H , and  f  h _L denote the unobserved job-finding rates 
of, respectively, type- 
_
 h in island H, type- h _  in island H, and type- h _ in island L.  w hH ,  w hL , and  w ℓL denote the observed 
wages of, respectively, type- h workers in island  H , type- h workers in island  L, and type-ℓ workers in island  L . 
 w  h _H ,  w  h _L , and  w  
_
 h H denote the unobserved wages of, respectively, type- h _ in island H, type- h _ in island L, and type- 
_
 h 
in island H.
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Following an adverse aggregate shock,  f  h _L declines less than  f  h _H , i.e., the job-find-
ing rate of type- h _ workers declines less in the  low-tech island than in the  high-tech 
island. As in Corollary 1 in the static model, this result comes from the ranking 
advantage enjoyed by type- h _ workers over type- ℓ workers. Because  high-skill work-
ers can partially jump the queue of unemployed in the  low-tech island but not in the 
 high-tech island, the length of the unemployment queue matters less in the  low-tech 
island, and  high-skill workers are less affected by an increase in the queue of unem-
ployed in the  low-tech island than by the same increase in the  high-tech island. 
changes (for a constant composition of the pool of job seekers), and (ii) the elasticity of job openings to changes 
in the composition of the unemployment pool as  x h changes. In our calibration, the estimated vacancy posting cost 
in the  low-tech island is significantly lower than in the  high-tech island, i.e., the value of unemployment is closer 
to the value of employment in the  low-tech island, and this makes vacancy posting in island  L more sensitive to 
productivity changes (echoing the point made by Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008). Thus, absent movements in 
 x h ,  q L would increase more than  q H . However, the increase in  x h stimulates job creation in island  L and thus atten-
uates the initial effect of lower productivity, so that overall the impulse responses of  q L and  q H are of similar 
magnitudes. 
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Figure 4. Impulse Response Functions to an Aggregate Productivity Shock
Notes:  Model-based impulse response functions to an aggregate productivity shock for (i)  island-specific pro-
ductivities ( φ ℓL and  φ hH , top left), (ii) “initial” queues ( q L and  q H , top right), (iii) job-finding rates in island  H for 
type- 
_
 h and type- h _ (  f  _ h H and  f  h _H , middle left), (iv) job-finding rates in island  L for type- h _ and type- ℓ (  f  h _L and  f ℓL , mid-
dle right), (v) fraction of  high-skill workers searching in the  low-tech island ( x h , bottom left), and (vi) wage cost of 
 underemployment ( w  h _H / w  h _L ,  bottom-right).
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The  high-skilled can thus smooth an adverse aggregate shock at the expense of the 
 low-skilled by moving down the job ladder in greater proportion. As type- h _ workers 
become  underemployed in greater proportion, they crowd out the type- ℓ workers, 
who see their job-finding rate (  f ℓL ) decline substantially more ( middle-right panel).
Interestingly, a similar mechanism takes place in the  high-tech island, which 
is also heterogeneous, and  f  
_
 h H declines less than  f  h _H ( middle-left panel). Type- 
_
 h 
 workers suffer a smaller decline in their job-finding rate than the  lower-skilled 
type- h _ because they enjoy a ranking advantage over type- h _ workers and are thus 
less affected by the adverse aggregate shock.
Finally, the wage cost of  underemployment ( w  h _H / w  h _L ) goes up at the same time 
as the share of type- h _ searching in island  L (bottom row).
Simulation.—We simulate an economy hit by aggregate productivity shocks. 
We simulate 32 years of monthly data (the same sample size as in the actual data 
used in Section I) and we repeat the exercise 1,000 times to obtain key moments 
of the simulated data. All the model statistics are then aggregated to quarterly 
frequency, following the same procedure that we apply to the data. The volatil-
ity and  auto-correlation of productivity are set to match the  standard-deviation and 
 auto-correlation of unemployment over 1979–2013.
Table 7 reports key moments of our simulated data and contrasts them with 
the data and the empirical regularities documented in Section I. We report the 
 standard deviation, the correlation with the unemployment rate, and the serial 
correlation of five key variables:  UE —the  underemployment rate—  f h and 
 f ℓ —the job-finding rates of type- ℓ and type- h workers— w hH / w hL —the (observed) 
wage cost of  underemployment—and  w hH / w ℓL —the ratio between the wage of type- 
h workers in island  H and the wage of type- ℓ workers in island  L .
Table 7—Simulated Moments
Underemployment Job-finding rates Wages
Variable  x   UE   f ℓ   f h   w hH / w hL   w hH / w ℓL 
Panel A. Data
 σ(x ) / σ(UR) 0.80 3.08 2.73 2.59 3.69
 ρ x, UR 0.57a −0.90 −0.84 0.16 0.38
 ρ x,  x −1  0.90 0.96 0.96 0.78 0.94
Panel B. Model
 σ(x ) /σ(UR) 0.93 3.55 2.63 1.88 2.55
 ρ x, UR 0.63a −0.81 −0.81 0.81 0.81
 ρ x,  x −1  0.90 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Notes: The empirical moments are estimated over the period 1983–2013 at a quarterly frequency, and wage series 
are cleaned from compositional effects (state, age, sex, and marital status). Model estimates are obtained from 1,000 
simulations of the model over 384 months (or 128 quarters).  f h  and  f ℓ denote the job-finding rates of type- h and 
type- ℓ workers, and  w hH ,  w hL , and  w ℓL denote the (average) wages of, respectively, type- h workers in island  H , type- 
h workers in island  L, and type- ℓ workers in island  L.
a  We report the correlation between underemployment and the four-quarter lag of unemployment. The contem-
poraneous correlation between unemployment and underemployment is 0.22 in the data and 0.57 in the model. 
Figure 5 shows the complete cross-correlogram between underemployment and unemployment (empirical and 
model-based).
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Overall, the model does a very good job at matching the main features of 
 underemployment documented in Section I. First, with aggregate productivity shocks 
alone, the model generates  countercyclical  underemployment, as in the data, with 
a variance in line with that observed in the United States (first column of Table 7).
Second, with a  countercyclical  underemployment rate,  high-skill workers smooth 
aggregate shocks and therefore smooth fluctuations in their job-finding rate. As a 
result, the job-finding rate of  high-skill workers is less volatile than the job-finding 
rate of  low-skill workers, as in the data (columns 2 and 3 of Table 7).
Third, the model generates the right cyclicality for both the wage loss associ-
ated with  underemployment ( w hH / w hL ) and the wage differential across islands ( w hH / w ℓL ). As in the data, the wage loss is  countercyclical, so that both the wage 
cost of  underemployment and  underemployment increase during recessions.39 The 
intuition for the mechanism at play in our model is simple: as  underemployment 
increases following a negative aggregate shock, type- h workers searching in island 
L become less unique, and competition with their peers becomes more intense. As 
a result, they extract a smaller share of the match surplus in island  L , and the wage 
cost of  underemployment  w hH / w hL increases.40
Finally, the model does a good job at capturing the dynamics of labor market 
variables and notably the dynamics of  underemployment. The model can capture 
the serial correlation of the main labor market variables (bottom row of Table 7) 
and does a good job with the  lead-lag relationship between  underemployment and 
unemployment (Figure 5). In fact, the model goes some way in reproducing the 
lagging behavior of  underemployment, with a peak correlation around five quarter 
lags (versus 8 in the data). To understand this result, the key is to note that the stock 
of  underemployed workers is a  slow-moving variable because the  underemployment 
rate is a measure of the composition of the employment pool. Since the probability 
of employment separation is relatively low, the composition of the employment pool 
changes slowly, and the  underemployment rate adjusts slowly to changes in the com-
position of the pool of job seekers. This slow adjustment of the  underemployment 
rate is in contrast with the rapid adjustment of the unemployment rate. The unem-
ployment rate adjusts fast because the speed of adjustment of unemployment is 
driven by the job-finding rate, which is an order of magnitude larger than the job 
separation rate (Shimer 2005b; Barnichon and Nekarda 2012).
D. Counterfactual Experiments
In this final section, we use our calibrated model to study the redistributive 
consequences of  underemployment, and study the inefficiency associated with 
 underemployment, notably its cyclical properties.
39 Note that the wage correlations and relative volatilities are somewhat larger in the model than in the data. This 
is likely due to the substantial measurement error in the CPS wage data that inflates the variance of measured wages 
and leads to a downward bias in the estimated empirical correlations (for classical measurement error). 
40 The model also matches the relative volatility of  w h and  w ℓ , the observed wages of type- h and type- ℓ workers. 
In the data, we have  σ( w h )/σ( w ℓ ) = 1.56 , while the model generates  σ( w h )/σ( w ℓ ) = 1.45 . In the model, the 
observed wage of type- h workers is more volatile because type- h workers adjust their  underemployment rate along 
the cycle—trading off lower wages for higher job-finding rates in recessions, and  vice-versa in expansions. 
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In a first experiment, we explore to what extent  underemployment helps the 
 high-skilled, smooth business cycle fluctuations at the expense of the  low-skilled. 
We perform a counterfactual simulation in which the shocks are identical to the pre-
vious simulation but in which we force the fraction of type- h workers searching in 
island  L to remain constant over time.
Table 8 shows how holding  x h fixed affects the volatility experienced by  low-skill 
workers. We can see that with a fixed  underemployment rate,  low-skill workers expe-
rience relatively smaller fluctuations in their job-finding rate and in their expected 
wage. Note, however, that this redistributive effect of  underemployment appears to 
be limited, as the decline in volatility is only in the order of  5 percent. The reason 
for this limited effect is a powerful general equilibrium effect. As  high-skill workers 
search in the  low-tech island in greater proportion, they stimulate job creation, which 
then dampens the initial  crowding-out effect of having more  high-skill job seekers. 
Absent any job creation effect (i.e., holding the number of job openings fixed), we 
found that the  counter-cyclicality of  underemployment would increase the volatility 
experienced by  low-skill workers by  41 percent.41 In other words, the job creation 
41 To put the large compensating effect of job creation into perspective, recall that in a homogeneous labor 
market (as in Pissarides 1985), the general equilibrium job creation effect is so strong that it entirely compensates 
for the increased congestion caused by having one more job seeker, as vacancy posting adjusts to the number of job 
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Figure 5. Cross-Correlogram between the Unemployment Rate and the Underemployment Rate, Data 
(1983–2013), and Model
Notes: Empirical (blue) and  model-based (red)  cross-correlations between the  underemployment and unemploy-
ment rates. Confidence intervals for the empirical  cross-correlations are calculated by using Fisher’s  z transform (at 
the 95 percent confidence level). 
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effect plays a critical role in dampening the negative effects of  underemployment for 
 low-skill workers. If that effect was not instantaneous or was weaker (for instance if 
firms could only imperfectly observe the composition of the unemployment pool), 
the redistributive effects of  underemployment could be large.
In a second experiment, we consider an economy hit by the same sequences of 
shocks as before, and we determine what the planner would do if he could allocate 
workers optimally between islands.42 Table 8 reports the key moments of this simu-
lated constrained efficient allocation.
Confirming the analytical results of Section II, the efficient allocation has a 
smaller average  underemployment rate than the decentralized one, i.e., there is too 
much  underemployment in the decentralized allocation.
Regarding the cyclicality of the inefficiency, we find that the inefficiency is 
largest in recessions, and the planner wants an even lower  underemployment rate 
in recessions. In other words, a policy aimed at alleviating the consequences of 
 underemployment would need to be  countercyclical; providing a stronger incen-
tive for  high-skill workers not to move down the job ladder when jobs are scarce. 
To get some intuition behind this result, note that the inefficiency stems from the 
bargaining configuration in which the firm negotiates with one  high-skill applicant 
and at least one other  low-skill applicant. Indeed, it is precisely in that configura-
tion that a marginal  high-skill job seeker alters the average surplus sharing between 
firms and workers. In all the other configurations—bargaining with only one appli-
cant or bargaining with two homogeneous applicants—a marginal  high-skill worker 
does not affect the surplus sharing rule. The inefficiency gets worse in recessions, 
because the probability of bargaining with heterogeneous applicants—the source of 
the inefficiency—increases in recessions. Indeed, ceteris paribus, as the number of 
job openings per job seekers decreases and the queue of job seekers increases, the 
probability that this queue includes one  high-skill worker increases,43 and so does 
the probability of a bargaining configuration with heterogeneous applicants.
seekers to keep the  vacancy-unemployment ratio constant. In our model with heterogeneous job seekers, the job 
creation effect compensates about  100 − 5/41 ≈ 87 percent of the extra congestion created by an increase in  x h . 
42 Specifically, we substitute the  no-arbitrage condition with the optimal allocation condition (4). 
43 Since there can only be one  high-skill applicant in this bargaining configuration, this is true as long as there 
are not already many  high-skilled searching in the low  tech-island (i.e.,  x h is not too large), which is the case for 
our parameter values. 
Table 8—Counterfactual Experiments
  E(UE)  σ(UE) _____σ(UR)   ρ UE, UR   σ(  f ℓ ) ____σ(  f h )   σ(  w ℓ ) _____σ(  w h )
Baseline 0.39 0.93 0.57 1.35 0.69
Fixed underemployment 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.28 0.66
Efficient underemployment 0.37 0.52 −0.38 1.29 0.67
Notes: Model estimates under the three different scenarios are obtained from 1,000 simulations of the model over 
384 months (or 128 quarters).  f 
 h and  f ℓ denote the job-finding rates of type- h and type- ℓ workers, and  w hH ,  w hL , 
and  w ℓL denote the wages of, respectively, type- h workers in island  H , type- h workers in island  L, and type- ℓ work-
ers in island  L .  E( · ) and  σ( · ) denote, respectively, the mean and standard deviation of a variable.
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IV. Conclusion
We study empirically the phenomenon of  underemployment in the United 
States and show that (i)  underemployment is strongly  countercyclical, (ii) 
 underemployment is costly—an  underemployed worker earning substantially less 
than his  non-underemployed counterpart—and the wage cost is  countercyclical, and 
(iii)  underemployment can be a persistent state for  newly underemployed individuals.
To explain these facts, we propose a search model with an endogenous “ranking” 
mechanism, in which  high-skill applicants are systematically hired over  less-skilled 
competing applicants. Some  high-skill workers become  underemployed in order 
to escape the competition for  high-skill jobs and find a job more rapidly. A quanti-
tative version of the model with aggregate productivity shocks can capture the key 
features of the  underemployment and notably its  counter-cyclicality.
Our endogenous ranking mechanism suggests two additional possible benefits 
of a higher education level. First, if firms prefer more educated workers to less 
educated ones, more educated workers can extract on average a larger share of a 
match surplus than less educated workers, i.e., they receive a higher labor income 
share. Second, a higher education level may not only guarantee a higher expected 
income but may also provide a lower volatility of income, because highly edu-
cated workers can partially smooth out adverse labor demand shocks by moving 
down the occupational ladder.
Finally, note that the  counter-cyclicality of  underemployment may offer an 
explanation for Davis and Wachter’s (2011) findings that the cumulative earnings 
losses associated with job displacement are substantial and larger if the displace-
ment occurs during a recession. While  underemployment is an optimal choice for 
 high-skill workers in our model, it is easy to imagine cases for which  high-skill 
workers are forced down the occupation ladder because of borrowing constraints 
or reputation considerations associated with long unemployment spells (Kroft, 
Lange, and Notowidigdo 2013). Then, if  underemployment is a persistent state 
and moving back up the ladder is difficult, a  high-skill worker who moves down 
the job ladder following displacement will suffer a persistent drop in income. 
Exploring this conjecture would be an interesting avenue for future research.
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Appendix A
Appendix B.  Underemployment in Standard Search Models
In this section, we argue that it is difficult (given the behavior of the US labor 
market) to rationalize the existence and the  counter-cyclicality of  underemployment 
using search models with random matching (Pissarides 1985). In particular, explain-
ing the  counter-cyclicality of  underemployment in a search model with random 
matching requires that either the wage cost of  underemployment is lower in reces-
sions or that finding a job in a  low-requirement occupation is easier in recessions. 
However, none of these two conditions appear to hold in the data.
To see that, consider a labor market divided in two islands: a  high-tech island 
(island  H ) and a  low-tech island (island  L ). In each island, and this is a key assump-
tion in random matching search models of the labor market, the matching probabil-
ity is independent of the worker type.
Denote by  f L the job-finding rate of a  high-skill worker in island  L , by 
 U L (resp.  W L1 ) the value of being unemployed (resp. employed) in island  L , and by 
f H and  U H ( W H ) the corresponding values in the  high-tech island  H .
As in the search and matching literature with multiple islands (Albrecht and 
Vroman 2002) or in the competitive search literature (Moen 1997),  high-skill 
workers choose in which labor market to look for a job. If  underemployment exists 
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Figure A1. Underemployment in the United States: Sensitivity Analysis
Notes: In panel A, the  underemployment rate (plain line) is defined as the fraction of individuals with some col-
lege education (or more) working in occupations requiring at most a high school degree (as defined in the 2012 
Occupational Outlook Handbook). The  underemployment rate series is cleared from composition effects (age, gen-
der, marital status, state of residence) and seasonal variations, but not from industry composition effects (unlike our 
baseline estimate in Figure 1). In panel B, we define the  underemployment rate as the fraction of workers that are 
 overqualified relative to the typical path of entry into an occupation, measured as the average education level of that 
occupation during the 1984–1990 sample period.
Source: Current Population Survey, 1983–2013
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in equilibrium, high-skill workers must be indifferent between all islands, which 
implies  U L =  U H or:44
(B1)   f L  _ 
r +  λ L +  f L ( w L − b) =  
 f H  _ 
r +  λ H +  f H ( w H − b)  
in which  w i is the wage,  λ i denotes the job separation rate in island  i ,  b denotes the 
value of home production including the unemployment benefits, and  r denotes the 
rate at which the future is discounted.
The Existence of Underemployment.—Since  underemployment entails 
a  non-negligible wage loss for  high-skill workers (Table 3), we have that 
 w L <  w H . As a result, for  underemployment to exist in equilibrium (i.e., for equa-
tion (B1) to be satisfied),  high-skill workers must have a higher job-finding rate in 
island  1 than in island  2 (  f L >  f H ).45 When matching is random, the job-finding rate 
is identical across worker types, so that  f L >  f H implies that it is easier to find a job 
in a  low-requirement occupation regardless of one’s type.
However, this pattern is at odds with the data. As illustrated in Figure B1, finding 
a job in a  low-requirement occupation takes, on average, just as long as finding a job 
in a  high-requirement occupation.
The Counter-Cyclicality of Underemployment.—The higher level of 
 underemployment in recessions (i.e., the  counter-cyclicality of  underemployment) 
is difficult to rationalize with standard search models because the cost of becoming 
 underemployed increases in recessions. Indeed, the wage cost of  underemployment is 
higher in recessions (Table 4), while finding a job in a  low-requirement occupation is 
not relatively easier in recessions (Figure B1). In fact, the opposite seems to happen: 
after controlling for composition (Table 7), the job-finding rate in  low-requirement 
occupations is more cyclical than the job-finding rate in  high-requirement occu-
pations ( σ(  f H ) > σ(  f L ) ), making the cost of  underemployment even larger in 
recessions.46
44 Considering the allocation in  steady state and assuming for ease of exposition that unemployment benefits are 
identical across islands and that separation rates are identical across islands. Recall that in an island with random 
search and constant job separation rate  λ i , the value of working in island  i is given by  r  W i =  w i +  λ i ( U i −  W i ) and 
r  U i = b +  f i ( W i −  U i ) , which gives  r  U i =   f i  _______ r +  λ i +  f i ( w i − b) . 
45 The separation rates are too small to matter ( λ i ≪  f i , Shimer 2012), and as shown in Section I, of the same 
order of magnitude across islands. 
46 Note that if workers were allowed to search simultaneously in both islands (devoting a fraction of their 
search time to searching in the  low-tech island), the random matching model could rationalize the existence 
of  underemployment. However, with  σ(  f H ) > σ(  f L ) that model would have a hard time rationalizing the 
 counter-cyclicality of  underemployment. 
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Appendix C
In this section, we provide some empirical evidence supporting the notion of 
ranking and the idea that firms prefer the most qualified workers when facing mul-
tiple applicants.47
Using experimental data compiled by Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013), 
we show that when workers apply for a  low-qualification job, workers with stronger 
résumés are substantially more likely to be called back by the firm than workers with 
just the required qualifications. Moreover, the rank of the candidate in the queue of 
applications influences the  call-back rate beyond the sheer quality of the résumé. 
This finding is consistent with the idea of ranking, but not with the idea of screening, 
in which only the quality of the résumé should matter.48
Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013) examines the effect of unemployment 
duration on callback rates using fictitious job applications in which a set of qual-
ity indicators are manipulated exogenously. Fictitious résumés were varied in their 
quality, and four résumés (two of a high type, and two of a low type) were sent to the 
same job posting. A “ low-quality” résumé has the minimum qualifications required 
for the job (in terms of experience and education), while a “ high-quality” résumé 
47 The notion of ranking is also consistent with qualitative evidence on firms’ recruitment behavior, with firms 
typically interviewing many applicants and hiring the most qualified candidate (Barron, Bishop, and Dunkelberg 
1985; Barron and Bishop 1985; Raza and Carpenter 1987; and Behrenz 2001). 
48 With screening, hiring is determined by a threshold level above which a candidate is hired, and  overqualified 
candidates are more likely to be above that threshold, irrespective of other candidates. By contrast, with ranking, 
firms select their new hire among the pool of applicants. Thus, the hiring rate depends on both the number and the 
quality of the other candidates. 
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has qualifications that exceeded these minimum, with extra years of experience and 
an extra level of education.49
Using this experimental setup, it is possible to test two important predictions of 
ranking.
First,  overqualified résumés should face higher call back rates than “ just-qualified” 
résumés competing for the same position. To test this prediction, we estimate three 
different specifications based on the following equation:
(C1)  C i, k = α + β  D i + δ  X i, k +  ε i, k , 
where  i denotes an applicant and  k denotes a job posting;  C i, k , our dependent vari-
able, is a callback dummy and  D i , our main explaining variable, is a dummy for 
 high-quality résumé. The vector of controls  X i, k includes individual  i characteristics (age and gender) and some job opening  k characteristics (type of job and city or job 
posting fixed effects depending on the specifications).
In the first specification, we only control for the individual characteristics and 
the three main categories of job (administrative, sales, customer services). In the 
second specification, we also control for the local labor market by including city 
fixed effects. Finally, in our third (and preferred) specification, we also include a 
job posting  fixed-effect, which allows us to compare résumés in competition for 
the same job opening. Table C1 presents the results and shows that, in all 3 specifi-
cations,  overqualified résumés have a callback rate that is about  35 percent higher 
than  just-qualified résumés. While the mapping from callback rates to job finding 
propensities is not straightforward, this evidence strongly suggests that firms do 
rank candidates by résumé’s quality, so that  higher educated job seekers likely have 
an easier time finding a job in a lower requirement occupation than their  lower edu-
cated peers.
Second, the rank of an applicant A should matter beyond the sole quality of his 
résumé. In other words, the quality of the other applicants should influence the 
 call-back rate of A above and beyond the quality of A’s résumé. To exploit varia-
tions in the quality of the other applicants, we use a factor that is  randomly drawn 
across individuals: unemployment duration (see Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo 
2013). We then test whether the rank (in terms of unemployment duration) of a 
candidate among the four applicants affect the  call-back rate  above-and-beyond the 
résumé’s quality.50 The last column of Table C1 shows that this is indeed the case, 
consistent with the implications of ranking. Adding an individual’s rank to our base-
line  specification, we can see that there is an additional,  non-negligible,  callback 
 premium for being ranked higher than the other applicants. This result is compatible 
with the prediction of a model with ranking but not with a model with screening.
49 For instance, if the job requires high school completion, the résumé would list an associate’s degree. 
50 We also control for the individual unemployment duration and the average unemployment duration of the 
three other applicants, as this could also affect the average  callback rate. 
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